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ACTS OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS IN THE EU: IS THE EU 




Abstract:  This Article seeks to determine if there is a legal basis for European 
Union (“EU”) Institutions to be held accountable for measures taken by an EU Member 
State in cases of financial distress.  The Article begins by exploring the concept of 
sovereignty and then evaluates the limitations placed on state sovereignty by participation 
in the EU.  Next, it explores the definitions of economic coercion and countermeasures 
and considers whether the actions taken by EU institutions in the context of the Cyprus 
banking haircut would satisfy either of these definitions.  Lastly, this Article studies 
whether EU law can provide a basis for liability of EU institutions in case of acts adopted 
by such institutions to address a financial crisis in a manner that targets the rights of 
investors and, in particular, in the Cyprus Banking Haircut. 
 
Cite as:  Venetia Argyropoulou, Acts of Financial Distress in the EU: Is the EU to 
Blame?, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 485 (2018). 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
There is no question that, in cases of extreme financial crisis, 
investors’ expectations and the value of their investments may be greatly 
affected by actions taken by the state.  However, before investors can seek 
recourse there are several important elements to consider.  Apart from the 
procedural and substantive legal hurdles an investor will face, investors must 
also determine the parties/persons against which investors’ claims will be 
raised.  Indeed, establishing the relevant party is of material importance; it 
determines competent courts, applicable law, and available property for 
enforcement.  At first glance, the question of the suitable defendant appears 
easy to answer, as in most cases the negative measures were adopted by the 
States themselves.  
 
However, this presumption of state responsibility was challenged in 
the 2013 Cyprus banking crisis that led to the haircut1 of deposits in 
Cyprus’s two largest banks.  Indeed, Cyprus’s president proclaimed that the 
decision for the haircuts actually was imposed by European Institutions.2   
This Article explores such allegations.  Additionally, in the case of sovereign 
default within the European Union (“EU”), this Article attempts to answer 
                                                          
† Lecturer, European University of Cyprus; PhD, Tilburg University. 
1  A haircut is the difference between prices at which someone can buy or sell a security.  
2  See President Nicos Anastasiades, Address to the People of Cyprus (Mar. 17, 2013) (stating that 
Eurogroup had given him two blackmail-style options, either disorderly bankruptcy or the depositors’ bail 
in). 
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the question of whether the EU can be held accountable for investors’ losses.  
In response to the above question, Part II of this Article explores the concept 
of sovereignty vis-à-vis a state’s participation in international organizations, 
with a focus on the EU.  In Part III, this Article studies the negative aspect of 
sovereignty, namely the principle of non-intervention, which protects a state 
from external interference by other sovereign states.  In this context, this 
Article reviews the notion of economic coercion and examines whether it 
constitutes such prohibited intervention.  In Part III, this Article explores 
whether the recent banking haircut in the eurozone, especially the Cyprus 
banking haircut, can be attributed to the EU and its institutions on the basis 
of economic coercion.  Lastly, the Article explores whether the EU and its 
institutions can be held liable for the Cyprus banking haircut under EU Law. 
 
II. THE NOTION OF SOVEREIGNTY 
 
A.  The History of the Concept of Sovereignty  
 
To explore whether liability can be attributed to the EU for the Cyprus 
banking haircut and the EU can therefore serve as a defendant, the notion of 
sovereignty is of vital importance.  The notion of sovereignty is 
controversial and has puzzled law scholars and political scientists almost 
since the inception of international law itself.3  The concept of sovereignty 
first arose in Rome.  However, the Roman understanding of sovereignty 
lacked a definite theory of how sovereignty is created.4  The current concept 
of sovereignty arose much later, in the 16th and 17th centuries. 
 
In the 16th century, in Les Six Livres de République, Jean Bodin 
recognized sovereignty as the absolute and perpetual power of a state to set 
binding laws, limited only by the laws of God and natural law.5  Thomas 
Hobbes, a century later, indicated that the sovereignty of the state is an 
absolute power superior to all, having a right over all.6  While both these 
theories conceptualize sovereignty as the absolute power of the state, they 
differ in how they treat powers outside of the state.  Specifically, Jean 
Bodin’s theory identified sovereignty as an unlimited power subject to 
                                                          
3   Helmut Steinberger, Sovereignty, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. IV 501 
(Rudolph Bernhardt 1st ed., 2000). 
4  C. H. McIlwain, A Fragment on Sovereignty, 48 POL. SCI. Q. 94, 96 (1933). 
5  Richard McKeon, Book Review, 74 ETHICS 74, 74–75 (1963) (reviewing JEAN BODIN, THE SIX 
BOOKS OF A COMMONWEALE (1576)). 
6  THOMAS HOBBES, THE CITIZEN Ch. 6 ¶¶ 12-15 (Bernard Gert ed., Thomas Hobbes trans., 1972) 
(1651).  
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neither external powers nor human laws.7  On the other hand, Hobbes 
considered sovereignty an absolute power within the state’s territory but 
failed to address the relationship of sovereignty to international law and 
international organizations.8 
 
Most scholars9 trace the modern concept of sovereignty to the end of 
the Thirty-Years’ War and the Treaty of Westphalia.10  The Treaty of 
Westphalia laid the ground for states to become “sovereign and 
independent” from the Holy Roman Empire.11  These states were sovereign 
in the sense that they enjoyed “supreme authority” over internal affairs 
within their territory and independence in their external relations.12  Such 
authority was secular, derived out of self-assertion and survival, rather than 
stemming from religious grounds.13  The Treaty of Westphalia recognized 
states were equal regardless of their form of governance or their allegiance 
to the Catholic or Protestant Church.14  As a consequence of these concepts 
of sovereignty and equality, the principle of non-intervention, or the idea 
that other states cannot interfere in a state’s internal affairs, is now a well-
established principle of international law.15 
 
B.  The Current Concept of Sovereignty 
 
Since the Treaty of Westphalia, case law and scholarly research have 
extensively explored the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention.  
                                                          
7  URMILA SHARMA & SUDESH KUMAR SHARMA, PRINCIPLES AND THEORY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
145 (2000); see also William C. van Vleck, Book Review, 44 HARV. L. REV. 317, 317 (1930) (reviewing 
CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS (1930)) (stating that Bodin’s 
philosophy “tended to discredit the old natural law ideas and to make the state the sole source of law”). 
8  See HOWARD WARRENDER, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF HOBBES: HIS THEORY OF OBLIGATION 
119 (1970) (analyzing what Hobbes considered international relations and the causes for the war among 
nations). 
9  See ROBERT ROSWELL PALMER & JOEL COLTON, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN WORLD 148 (1992) 
(noting the elements of statehood can be traced before that time); but see K. J. Holsti, Book Review, 1 
JAPANESE J. POL. SCI. 157–72 (2000) (reviewing STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED 
HYPOCRISY (1999)). 
10  G. John Ikenberry, Book Review, 80 FOREIGN AFF. 157 (2001) (reviewing DANIEL PHILPOTT, 
REVOLUTIONS IN SOVEREIGNTY: HOW IDEAS SHAPED MODERN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (2001)). 
11  D. W. Greig, Book Review, 58 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 366, 366–68 (1988) (reviewing ANTONIO 
CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD (1986)).  
12  DJURA NINČIĆ, THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CHARTER AND IN THE PRACTICE OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS 5 (1970). 
13  Helmut Steinberger, Sovereignty, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. IV 501 
(Rudolph Bernhardt, 1st ed. 2000). 
14  BRIAN R. URLACHER, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS NEGOTIATION 19 (2015). 
15 Michael Wood, Non-Intervention (Non-interference in domestic affairs), ENCYCLOPEDIA 
PRINCETONIENSIS, https://pesd.princeton.edu/?q=node/258 (last visited Nov. 27, 2017). 
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However, despite this analysis, both concepts continue to be fluid and 
puzzling.  The first case to set out a widely-accepted definition of 
sovereignty was the Island of Palmas Arbitral Award of 1928.  The award 
stipulated that “[s]overeignty in the relations between states signifies 
independence.  Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right 
to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other state, the functions of a 
state.”16  As the Palmas case indicates, independence is inherently linked 
with the element of territory in the sense that, for an entity to be 
independent, it should be able to freely dispose of its own territory without 
external interferences.17 
 
This definition also directly linked sovereignty with the concept of 
statehood, although the two concepts are not identical.  Indicatively, Article 
1 of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States of 1933, 
which echoes customary international law, defines a state as a person of 
international law which possesses: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined 
territory; (c) government in the sense of dominion; and (d) capacity to enter 
into relations with other States.”18  Indeed, it is a principle of international 
law that sovereign states enjoy absolute dominion within their territory 
without external intervention. 
 
C.  The Sovereignty of International Entities 
 
These definitions focus on states.  However, they do not indicate 
whether international entities other than states may enjoy sovereignty in the 
sense described above.  This question is of particular relevance in relation to 
international organizations, particularly the EU. 
 
EU institutions possess unusual powers and traits, including, inter 
alia, citizenship, the lack of internal borders within member states, and the 
development of a supranational legal system of “EU law.”19  However, such 
powers and traits were awarded to the EU by the member states through 
international conventions rather than arising as inherent EU characteristics.  
                                                          
16  Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v Neth.), Hague Ct. Rep. II RIAA 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928). 
17  Geert Van Calster, International Law and Sovereignty in the Age of Globalization, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 106 (Aaron Schwabach & John Cockfield eds., 2009). 
18  Convention on Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 U.N.T.S. 19. 
19  See Case 6/64, Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 587 (" . . . the EEC Treaty has created its own legal 
system which . . . became an integral part of the legal systems of the Member States and which their courts 
are bound to apply."). 
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In particular, the Treaty of Rome,20 the Treaty of Maastricht,21 and the 
Treaty of Lisbon22 created the EU institutions which enjoy these powers and 
thus played a large role in the creation of the EU. 
 
Prior to these treaties, the powers listed above were exercised by the 
governments of each member state.  Through these treaties, states agreed to 
award such powers to EU institutions.  As with any other international 
treaty, the obligations assumed by the states through these treaties are 
mandatory on the basis of states’ consent and the well-established 
international law principle “pacta sunt servanda.”23  In this sense, no 
member state can enjoy sovereignty in the sense described above—an 
absolute power free from external interventions—as, inter alia, member 
states have delegated their sovereignty to the EU and share that power in 
certain policy areas. 
  
The EU has led scholars to question the previous definition of 
sovereignty and consider alternative theories of sovereignty that will 
adequately include the EU in their ambit.  Bodin’s unitary and indivisible 
nature of sovereignty does not allow for delegation of powers by a state to 
an external authority and therefore could not address the current situation 
with the EU.24  In response, scholars have invoked other theories of 
sovereignty, such as pooled sovereignty.25  Indeed, the EU is considered a 
prominent example of pooled sovereignty,26 or “poly-centered sovereignty.”  
In the model of pooled sovereignty, the powers are both disaggregated and 
reaggregated.  They are disaggregated in the sense that the state does not 
enjoy exclusive authority over its policies,27 while they are reaggregated in 
the sense that EU regulations and directives are adopted by the EU 
                                                          
20  Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 294 U.N.T.S. 3. 
21  Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7,1992, 1755 U.N.T.S. 3. 
22  Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2702 U.N.T.S. 3. 
23  FABRIZIO CAPOGROSSO, SHARED SOVEREIGNTY AND DENATIONALISATION OF STATEHOOD IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 11 (2008). 
24  See generally STEPHEN D. KRASSNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999). 
25  See NANNERL O KEOHANE, PHILOSOPHY AND THE STATE IN FRANCE 71 (1980) (stating "we see the 
principal point of sovereign majesty and absolute power to consist in giving laws to subjects in general, 
without their consent"); see also Robert Keohane, Ironies of Sovereignty: The European Union and the 
United States, 40 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 743, 743–65 (2002). 
26  Pooled sovereignty, OXFORD INDEX , 
http://oxfordindex.oup.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100336931 (last visited Nov. 30, 2017). 
27  Hadii M. Mamudu & Donley T. Studlar, Multilevel Governance and Shared Sovereignty: 
European Union, Member States, and the FCTC, 22 GOVERNANCE 73, 73–97 (2009). 
490                           WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL                VOL. 27 NO. 2  
 
institutions and apply uniformly to all member states.28  In pooled 
sovereignty, states remain sovereign but contractually delegate their powers 
to an external institution.  The external institution operates collectively, as it 
is comprised by all member states, and sets policies that may differ from 
each individual state’s ideal standpoint in the interest of international 
cooperation and collective good.29 
 
Some commentators suggest that pooled sovereignty is not an 
appropriate concept for the EU because this type of sovereignty is exercised 
by several actors and is therefore unable to address the current status of the 
EU, especially the Economic Monetary Union (“EMU”).30  On one hand, the 
transfer of sovereignty within the EU exceeds mere “pooling” in the area of 
monetary policy, as monetary authority is exercised almost exclusively at an 
EU level.  On the other hand, in areas such as fiscal policy, power is mostly 
exercised by the states independently.31  Some commentators argue that, in 
such a case, sovereignty is divided: certain competencies are prerogatives of 
the State, while others belong to the EU. 32 
 
Even this notion appears simplistic and falls short of addressing the 
shared competencies that belong both to the states and to the EU.33  In 
response, scholars developed the theory of cooperative sovereignty.  Here, 
sovereign states collaborate with other sovereign entities while applying the 
same rules and principles as in a pluralist constitutional order.34  Instead of 
being applied in an hierarchical order, these rules work toward the same end, 
namely the fulfilment of their shared sovereign values, including a common 
market free from internal borders, common agriculture and fishery policies, 
and common minimum standards on human rights.35  Scholars have 
criticized this as “unsound,” because sovereignty in itself cannot be 
                                                          
28  Thomas W. Pogge, Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, 103 ETHICS 48, 48–75 (1992); See also 
Neil Walker, Late Sovereignty in the European Union, in SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION 15 (Neil Walker 
ed., 2006). 
29  Nicolas Jabko, Which Economic Governance for the European Union? Facing up to the Problem 
of Divided Sovereignty, SWEDISH INST. FOR EUR. POL’Y STUD. 13 (2011), 
http://www.sieps.se/sites/default/files/2011_2_1.pdf. 
30  Samantha Besson, Sovereignty in Conflict, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ONLINE PAPERS (2004), 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-015a.htm. 
31  Jabko, supra note 29, at 13. 
32  Id. 
33  Enzo Cannizzaro, Introduction to THE EUROPEAN UNION AS AN ACTOR IN INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS xiv (Enzo Cannizzaro ed., 2002). 
34  NEIL MACCORMICK, QUESTIONING SOVEREIGNTY: LAW, STATE, AND NATION IN THE EUROPEAN 
COMMONWEALTH 203 (2002).  
35  See id.; Besson, supra note 30, at 14. 
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divided.36  Dividing sovereignty would undermine the nature of sovereignty 
as an absolute power, as it is only competencies that can be limited.37  
Nonetheless, cooperative sovereignty supports the notion that competencies 
can be delegated, because delegation is nothing more than a demonstration 
and reaffirmation of sovereignty.38 
 
While it is clear that the concept of sovereignty is unresolved, 
particularly in terms of the EU, a few conclusions can be drawn.  
Specifically, sovereignty allows a state, in such fields and policy areas where 
it has not delegated authority to other institutions, to regulate its internal 
affairs free from external interferences.  The EU is a unique case.  The EU 
enjoys sui generis powers similar to the sovereignty awarded by the member 
states through international conventions. 
 
III.  THE NEGATIVE ASPECT OF SOVEREIGNTY 
 
A. The Non-Intervention Principle 
 
As noted above, sovereignty entails absolute dominion over a state’s 
territory, free from any external interference by other sovereign states.  The 
definition of sovereignty thus implies that sovereign states have a negative 
obligation not to interfere in the internal affairs of other states, as all states 
are equal.  The principle of non-intervention constitutes one of the 
fundamental norms of international law. In fact, many scholars, such as 
Antonio Cassese and Jianming Shen, argue that the principle of non-
intervention has risen to the status of jus cogens.39  The principle is 
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.  Although the Charter does 
not explicitly refer to non-intervention, it can be inferred from Articles 2(4) 
and 2(7).40  It can also be inferred from the Friendly Relations Declaration.41 
                                                          
36  See Martin Loughlin, Why Sovereignty?, in SOVEREIGNTY AND THE LAW: DOMESTIC, EUROPEAN 
AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 46 (Richard Rawlings et al. eds., 2013). 
37  Id. at 47. 
38  Id.  
39  ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 147 (1986) (“The importance of 
this principle [of nonintervention] for States leads one to believe that it has by now become part and parcel 
of jus cogens.”); Jianming Shen, The Non-Intervention Principle and Humanitarian Interventions under 
International Law, 7 INT’L LEGAL THEORY 1, 5 (2001); see also 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 428 
(Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 2008) (stating that the principle "is a corollary of every 
state's right to sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence"). 
40  Philip Kunig, Prohibition of Intervention, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Apr. 2008), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e1434?prd=EPIL. 
41  G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at 121–24 (Oct. 24, 1970). 
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The principle of non-intervention is explicitly identified in the UN 
General Assembly Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and 
Interference in the Domestic Affairs of States.42  Furthermore, Article 32 of 
the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States prohibits “the use of 
economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in 
order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign 
rights.”43  The principle was also recognized by the International Court of 
Justice (“ICJ”) in its very first case, Corfu Channel, United Kingdom v. 
Albania.44 
 
Finally, the principle was emphasized in the renowned judgment in 
Nicaragua vs. United States. There, the court determined that “the principle 
of non-intervention involves the right of every sovereign State to conduct its 
affairs without outside interference; though examples of trespass against this 
principle are not infrequent, the Court considers that it is part and parcel of 
customary international law.”45  The Court later states “the principle forbids 
all States or groups of States to intervene directly or indirectly in the internal 
or external affairs of other States” and that:  
 
[A] prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on 
matters in which each State is permitted, by the principle of 
State sovereignty, to decide freely.  One of these is the choice 
of a political, economic, social and cultural system, and the 
formulation of foreign policy.  Intervention is wrongful when it 
uses methods of coercion in regard to such choices, which must 
remain free ones . . . the element of coercion . . . defines, and 
indeed forms the very essence of, prohibited intervention.46  
 
According to Professor Antonios Tzanakopoulous, a scholar and 
author in this area, the Court in the Nicaragua case recognized that states 
enjoy an area of freedom where each respective state may act alone in the 
                                                          
42  G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), at 11–12 (Dec. 21, 1965). 
43  G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), at 50–55 (Dec. 12, 1974).  
44  Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Merits, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, ¶ 121 (Apr. 9, 1949) (The Court 
proclaimed “the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in the 
past, given right to the most serious abuses and as such cannot, whatever be the present defects in 
international organization, find a place in international law.”). 
45  Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
Merits, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 202 (June 27). 
46  Id. at ¶ 205. 
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manner it pleases stemming from that state’s sovereignty.47  That area 
includes fiscal, tax, and foreign policy and the free choice of political, 
economic, social, and cultural systems.48  Within that area, as discussed 
above, no external intervention is permissible.  However, that freedom may 
be circumscribed by obligations assumed by states through international 
treaties. 
 
Despite the seemingly-established status of the principle of non-
intervention, as will be demonstrated below, the actual content of the non-
intervention principle is unclear.49 Additionally, the principle has been set 
aside or abused several times by states with significant economic power 
through economic coercion.50 
 
Contributing to the lack of clarity on the principle of non-intervention, 
case law is limited to few cases with very specific fact patterns.   
Indicatively, the ICJ has only examined three cases relating to the principle 
of non-intervention, namely the Corfu Channel case,51 the case of Nicaragua 
v. United States of America,52 and the case of DRC v. Uganda,53 all of which 
had very specific facts that related to the use of military force.54  Thus, in 
light of the limited caselaw, there is no consensus on what constitutes 
intervention, and therefore which intervention is not allowed under 
international law.55  For the purposes of this study, this Article will focus 
only on the notion of “economic coercion,” which constitutes a form of 
prohibited intervention.  
                                                          
47  Antonios Tzanakopoulos, The Right to be Free from Economic Coercion, 4 CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 616, 618–19 (2015). 
48  Id.  
49  See generally Oliver J. Lissitzyn, Book Review, 76 HARV. L. REV. 668 (1963) (reviewing MYRES 
S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL 
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION (1961)). 
50  See generally T. Akinola Aguda, Book Review, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 284 (1987) (reviewing 
DILEMMAS OF ECONOMIC COERCION: SANCTIONS IN WORLD POLITICS (Miroslav Nincic & Peter 
Wallensteen eds., 1983)). 
51  See generally Corfu Channel, supra note 44 (referred to U.K.’s unauthorized entry into the 
territorial waters of Albania, so as to look for mines that would be brought as evidence before the I.C.J.).  
52  See generally Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 
supra note 45 (related to armed activities taken by U.S. military forces against the Nicaraguan 
Government).  
 53  See generally Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo 
v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168 (Dec. 19, 2005) (related to the presence and action of the 
military forces of Uganda on the borders of eastern Congo). 
54  NATALINO RONZITTI, COERCIVE DIPLOMACY, SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (2016). 
55  JOHN CHARVET & ELISA KACZYNSKA-NAY, THE LIBERAL PROJECT AND HUMAN RIGHTS 275 
(2008); one exception is the use of force which is specifically prohibited under Art. 2.4 of the UN Charter. 
U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
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B. Economic Coercion 
 
Defining economic coercion is not an easy task, as a large portion of 
the actions taken by states to optimize their economic self-interests leads to 
detrimental consequences for other states.56  Economic coercion can include 
all methods traditionally used for economic compulsion.57  In fact, since 
World War II, economic relations among states have been shaped by the 
practice of economic coercion.58  Clearly not every action that falls into this 
category can be deemed illegal.  Rather, only those practices that are 
unnecessarily or unreasonably destructive to the essential values of an 
innocent target state, or which might significantly endanger international 
peace, are prohibited.59 
 
Professor Derreck Bowett suggested that the decisive element of 
whether various economic measures should be considered illegal coercion 
depends on if the action taken by the involved state can be attributed to an 
improper motive or intent.60  Put simply, an act on its own cannot be 
coercive, but it may become illegal coercion upon proof of improper motive 
or purpose.61  Since a state’s mens rea is not easy to deduce, let alone prove, 
Professor Bowett indicated that “it will require a great deal of practice, of 
‘case-law’, to give the concept of illegal economic coercion substance and 
definition.”62 
 
Another criterion that was suggested to determine whether economic 
measures could constitute illegal coercion is whether the state imposing the 
measures does so to obtain “advantages of any kind” while subordinating the 
sovereignty of the state upon which the coercion is inflicted.63  Again, this 
criterion is vague, as economic measures cannot be deemed illegal on the 
sole basis that they convey advantages to the acting state while damaging the 
interests of another state, particularly given the competition existing between 
                                                          
56  See Lissitzyn, supra note 49. 
57  Comment, The Use of Nonviolent Coercion: A Study in Legality under Article 2(4) of the Charter 
of the United Nations, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 983, 991 (1974). 
58  See Aguda, supra note 50. 
59  Paul Stephen Dempsey, Economic Aggression & Self-Defense in International Law: The Arab Oil 
Weapon and Alternative American Responses Thereto, 9 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 253, 261 (1977). 
60  Derek Bowett, Economic Coercion and Reprisals by States, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 5 (1977). 
61  Edwin Ifeanyichukwu Nwogugu, Legal problem of foreign investments, in 153 RECUEIL DES 
COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, at 253 (1983). 
62  See Bowett, supra note 60, at 4. 
63  See, e.g., G.A. Res. 3171 (XXVIII), at 52–53 (Dec. 17, 1973); Andre Beirlaen, Economic 
Coercion and Justifying Circumstances, 18 REV. B.D.I. 57, 67 (1984). 
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various economies.64  According to Professor Tzanakopoulos, a decisive 
conclusion can be inferred from Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, which refers to the case when a State is coerced to enter 
into an international treaty.  In such a case, the treaty is nonetheless valid 
unless coercion was exercised by threat or use of force.65 
 
“Force” refers to any military force or physical force, used or 
threatened.  However, it is unclear whether economic or political force is 
included in the definition of “use of force.”  The definition of “force” 
becomes essential in such a case, as a literal interpretation of the word might 
lead to the conclusion that force is limited to armed force, while a broader, 
liberal interpretation of the term would include political and economic force.  
This matter troubled the states when negotiating the Vienna Convention,66 
but the choice of words of Article 52 demonstrates their unwillingness to 
clear up this matter.67 
 
As might be expected, the scholars are divided on this topic.  Some 
commentators support the view that political and economic pressure is not 
included in the notion of force.68  Others argue that the term “force” should 
not be limited to military action, but should also include economic and 
political coercion that may endanger international peace, security, or 
justice.69  This view is supported by the Separate Declaration on the 
Prohibition of Military, Political and Economic Coercion in the Conclusion 
of Treaties, which was separately adopted in 1969 by the delegates of the 
UN Conference on the Law of Treaties.70  The declaration specifically 
                                                          
64  See Beirlaen, supra note 63, at 69. 
65  See Tzanakopoulos, supra note 47, at 621. 
66  In the first session of the International Conference held to formulate the Draft Articles on the Law 
of Treaties into an International Treaty in 1968, the meaning of coercion was deliberated in great detail. In 
this regard, Article 49 of the Draft Articles (current Article 51) was proposed to be amended by the 19th 
Amendment so that economic and political pressure would be included. This issue was discussed in the 
fiftieth meeting, held on May 3, 1968, but no consensus could be reached. See K.R. Vivek, Coercion: 
Economic and Political Pressure, 1 “UGDAM VIGYATI” - THE ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE 1, 2 (2015) (India). 
67  Robert E. Dalton, Book Review, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 898, 898–903 (2012) (reviewing THE 
VIENNA CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY (Olivier Corten & Pierre Klein eds., 
2011)). 
68  See, e.g., LASSA FRANCIS & LAWRENCE OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE. 
DISPUTES, WAR AND NEUTRALITY (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952); C.H.M. Waldock, 
The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, in 81 RECUEIL DES COURS: 
COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 492 (1951). 
69  See, e.g., JULIUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: A TREATISE ON THE 
DYNAMICS OF DISPUTES – AND WAR-LAW iv, 851 (1954).  
70  CATHERINE BRÖLMANN & YANNICK RADI, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING 95 (2016). 
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condemns “the threat or use of pressure in any form whether military, 
political or economic by any State in order to coerce . . . .”71 
 
 In all cases, the equation of coercion with illegal intervention should 
be interpreted to mean that anything short of coercion, e.g. mere interference 
with a state’s choices, is lawful, so long as the interfering state does not 
breach any of its own obligations under international law.72  Thus, 
identifying the scope of what is considered coercion is necessary to 
determine whether recent haircuts in the eurozone, and especially the Cyprus 
banking haircut, can be attributed to the EU and its institutions on the basis 
of coercion. 
 
IV. THE FACTS OF THE CYPRUS HAIRCUT 
 
Cyprus is the third smallest country in the EU and is located in the 
northeastern Mediterranean Sea, to the south of Turkey.  Although it joined 
the EU as a de facto divided island, the entire country is part of the EU 
territory.73  Cyprus is a well-established financial and investment center due 
to its investor-friendly tax regime and, up to 2013, it had a strong financial 
and service sector. 
 
In March 2013, Cyprus was shocked when the national government 
decided to close Cyprus’ second largest bank, Cyprus Popular Bank 
(“CPB”), imposed a depositor bail-in on the deposits of Cyprus’ largest 
bank, Bank of Cyprus (“BOC”), and imposed capital controls on all deposits 
in Cyprus banks.  Other authors have explored reasons behind the financial 
and banking crisis in the Republic of Cyprus.74  This Article explores 
whether the banking haircut was a product of coercion by the EU’s 
institutions, especially the European Central Bank (“ECB”) and the Council 
of the EU, as was contemplated by the President of Cyprus, Mr. 
Anastasiades.75 
 
                                                          
71  U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, Reports of the Committee of the Whole, art. 49, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.39/14 (1969).  
72  Tzanakopoulos, supra note 47, at 9 
73  European Union Immigration: Cyprus, EUROPEAN UNION IMMIGRATION, 
https://www.euimmigration.org/eu_cyprus.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2017). 
74  See G.I., An interview with Athanasios Orphanides: What Happened in Cyprus?, ECONOMIST 
(Mar. 28, 2013), https://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2013/03/interview-athanasios-
orphanides. 
75  See Anastasiades, supra note 2 (stating that Eurogroup had given him two blackmail-style options: 
disorderly bankruptcy or the depositors’ bail in). 
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The problems faced by the two major banks in Cyprus did not appear 
out of the blue.  Indeed, there were several signs that the banks were in 
distress well before March 2013, but these were neglected.  Indicatively, as 
part of a Capital Exercise conducted on October 26, 2011 by the European 
Banking Authority (“EBA”) and the Central BOC, BOC identified a capital 
buffer of €1.472 billion and CPB identified a capital buffer of € 2.116 
billion.76  As a result, at the beginning of November 2011, the credit ratings 
agency, Moody’s, downgraded three Cypriot banks.  In particular, BOC was 
downgraded by one notch to Ba2 from Ba1, Hellenic Bank by one notch to 
Ba2 from Ba1, and Marfin Popular Bank Public Co. Ltd. by three notches to 
B2 from Ba2.77  Not long after the downgrades, EBA issued its 
recommendation on the creation and supervisory oversight of temporary 
capital buffers to restore market confidence.78  This recommendation 
required national supervisory authorities of participating EU member state 
banks to raise their Core Tier 1 Capital to nine percent after accounting for 
an additional buffer against stressed sovereign risk holdings by June 30, 
2012. 
 
Both BOC and CPB needed additional funding.  Correspondingly, on 
March 2, 2012, CPB announced a capital-raising plan, but the Greek 
Sovereign Bonds Haircut through Private Sector Involvement (“PSI”) had 
immediate and devastating implications for both banks.  Indeed, the two 
banks had purchased large amounts of Greek Government Bonds and lost 
billions of euros through the Greek PSI.79  In particular, BOC announced 
losses of one billion euros, while CPB announced losses of two and a half 
billion euros,80 which further increased the needs for additional capital 
buffer.  Cyprus could have requested support for its banks by the EU, but 
                                                          
76  See Fiona Mullen, Greek Haircut: Cyprus Banks Announce EUR 3.6 Bln Buffer Need, FIN. 
MIRROR (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.financialmirror.com/news-details.php?nid=24841. 
77  See Moody's Downgrades Three Cypriot Banks Following Cyprus Sovereign Downgrade; Banks 
On Review For Further Downgrade, MOODY’S INV. SERV. (Nov. 8, 2011), 
https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-downgrades-three-Cypriot-banks-following-Cyprus-sovereign-
downgrade-banks--PR_229745. 
78  See EBA Recommendation on the Creation and Supervisory Oversight of Temporary Cap. Buffers 
to Restore Mkt. Confidence, U.N. Doc. EBA/REC/2011/1, at 1 (Dec. 8, 2011).  
79 See Panicos Demetriades, Governor, Cent. Bank of Cyprus, Cyprus Financial Crisis: The 
Framework for an Economic Recovery Within the Eurozone at ¶6 (Dec. 11, 2012) (transcript available at 
https://www.centralbank.cy/en/the-governor/previous-governors/previous-governor-s-speeches/panicos-o.-
demetriades/11122012).  The discussion was organised by the Hellenic American Bankers Association and 
the Cyprus-US Chamber of Commerce, where it stipulated that “The Greek PSI alone cost Cypriot banks 
nearly 25% of the country’s GDP, because of excessive concentration of Greek debt in the balance sheets 
of the two largest Cypriot banks.” 
80  George Psyllides, 2.5 Billion Euro Loss for Marfin, LAWYERS IN CYPRUS (Mar. 1, 2012), 
http://www.lawyersincyprus.com/el/news-read/25-billion-euro-loss-for-marfin. 
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that would have required Cyprus to agree to a Memorandum of 
Understanding with the Troika, something that the Cyprus government was 
not prepared to do at the time due to the political cost that was at stake once 
agreeing to severe austerity measures.  Instead, in an attempt to help salvage 
CPB, the Cypriot Parliament agreed on May 18, 2012 to underwrite the issue 
of €1.8 billion in capital for the bank’s recapitalization, in case the latter was 
unable to raise funds from private sources.  This underwriting raised state 
aid concerns, but it was approved by the European Commission on 
September 13, 2012 on the precondition that the Cyprus authorities would 
submit a plan no later than six months from the date of the European 
Commission’s approval, to demonstrate how the bank would become viable 
with the assistance of the state.81  
 
By the deadline of June 30, 2012, CPB had only raised €3 million, 
although the Cyprus government acquired bank shares which amounted to 
the equivalent of about €1.8 billion.82  The state paid CPB by transferring a 
12-month sovereign bond, which would be rolled over for a period of five 
years.  By that time, all three major credit rating agencies had downgraded 
Cyprus’ sovereign debt to junk status, thus eliminating the possibility that 
the ECB could accept Cypriot bonds as collateral for a loan.83  
 
On June 25, 2012, Cyprus entered the European Stability Mechanism 
(“ESM”) without specifying the amount of money it required, something 
that was necessary in order for a Memorandum of Understanding to be 
negotiated between Cyprus and the ESM.  Unfortunately, a settlement was 
not reached until after the Eurogroup meeting on March 15, 2013.  In the 
meantime, both major banks in Cyprus required Emergency Liquidity 
Assistance (“ELA”) from the Central BOC.  This was approved by both the 
Central BOC and by the ECB.  The details of this provision were unknown 
at the time, as neither the ECB nor the National Central Banks (“NCBs”), 
including the Cyprus Central Bank, publish details on their collateral 
holdings that are part of the monetary policy operations of the Eurosystem.84  
As was later revealed, CPB had already resorted to ELA in September 27, 
                                                          
81  See European Commission Press Release IP/12/958, The Commission, Rescue Recapitalisation of 
Cyprus Popular Bank (Sep. 13, 2012).  
82  Press Release, Ministry of Finance, Recapitalisation of CPB Public Co. Ltd. and BOC Public Co. 
Ltd., (Sept. 2, 2012). 
83  James Wilson, Daniel Dombey & Peter Spiegel, Cyprus Requests Eurozone Bailout, FIN. TIMES, 
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84  Willem Buiter, Jürgen Michels & Ebrahim Rahbari, ELA: An Emperor without Clothes? CITI 
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2011,85 initially requesting 300 million euros.  That amount grew to 1.8 
billion on January 2012, 3.8 billion in May 2012, 4.2 billion by February 
2013, and by the time CPB was led into resolution, the amount grew to a 
staggering 9.1 billion euros.86 
 
The two banks received ELA from the Central BOC until March 21, 
2013, with the consent of the Governing Council of the ECB.  On March 21, 
2013, the ECB’s Governing Council announced that, in accordance with 
prior decisions, on March 25, 2013, it would cease to provide ELA to both 
Cypriot banks, due to “the lack of clear and binding policy decisions on 
behalf of the Cypriot side to implement a preliminarily agreed financial 
assistance programme.”87  However, it was already clear that CPB would 
become insolvent by the end of 2012, as it was in no position to service ELA 
past June 2012.88 
 
This fact appears to have been known to the ECB.  Indicatively, in 
response to a request for an opinion on the Cypriot government’s plan for 
the recapitalization of CPB, the ECB stated that “the objectives pursued by 
the support measures may be better achieved through bank resolution 
tools.”89  Hence, the continued provisioning of ELA to CPB was 
questionable, as it is contrary to the ECB’s rule that ELA is awarded only to 
solvent institutions.90  In an attempt to defend its actions, the Central BOC 
argued that not assisting CPB would lead to bankruptcy, which would cause 
panic and threaten the entire banking system.91 
 
In addition to the problems with the two major banks, Cyprus also had 
to address its own debt.  By March 2013, the country was in need of an 
estimated 17 billion euros, which corresponded approximately to the size of 
                                                          
85  Athanasios Orphanides, What Happened in Cyprus? The Economic Consequences of the Last 
Communist Government in Europe (Inst. for Monetary and Fin. Pol’y Working Paper Series, No. 79, 2014), 
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/97787/1/IMFS_WP_79.pdf. 
86  Gikas A. Hardouvelis, Overcoming the Crisis in Cyprus, EUROBANK (2014), 
http://www.hardouvelis.gr/FILES/PROFESSIONAL%20WORK/20January2014Q.pdf. 
87  Provision of Emergency Liquidity Assistance to the Two Largest Cypriot Banks, CENT. BANK OF 
CYPRUS (June 17, 2013), https://www.centralbank.cy/en/announcements/17062013. 
88  G.I., supra note 74, at 18 
89  Opinion of the European Central Bank CON/2012/50, on the Recapitalization of the Cyprus 
Popular Bank (Jul. 2, 2012).  
90  Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) and Monetary Policy, EUR. CENT. BANK (2016), 
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ECON. POL’Y REV. 3, 29 (2014). 
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the country’s entire economy.92  Thus, in March 2013, the newly appointed 
Cypriot government was faced with a difficult choice: accept the terms of 
the bailout programme offered by Troika “as is,” or further delay the 
negotiations to achieve a better deal and face possible collapse of its banking 
system and economy.  The initial deal negotiated by European finance 
ministers, the ECB, and the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), provided 
for a one-time “haircut” of 6.75% for deposits of up to €100,000 and 9.99% 
for deposits above €100,000.  This included all deposits (in current and fixed 
deposit accounts, interest bearing or not) and all banks (including branches 
of international banks) operating in Cyprus.93  The measure was strongly 
criticized as a “disastrous precedent.”94 On March 18, 2013, the bill for said 
measure was debated in the Cyprus parliament and was rejected on March 
19, 2013.95 
 
On March 21, 2013, the Governing Council of the ECB decided to 
maintain the current level of ELA until March 25, 2013.  After that, ELA 
could only be considered if an EU/IMF program was put in place that would 
ensure the solvency of the concerned banks.  Thus, the deadline for the 
Cypriot government to reach a bailout program was March 25, 2013, after 
which “Pandora’s Box” would open. 
 
On March 22, 2013, the Cypriot Parliament focused on negotiations to 
find a way to reach a bailout deal before the 25th of March, but this deal 
required that Cyprus gather six billion euros to fund its share of the bailout.96  
During that period, the Cyprus banking system remained closed and capital 
controls were enforced in accordance with the terms of the bailout.  In 
response to these developments, the Cypriot government enacted eight 
distinct laws aimed at emergency assistance for the economy and banks (the 
“Bank Resolution Framework”), including Law 17(I)/2013 for the 
                                                          
92  Michele Kambas & Deepa Babington, After election win, Anastasiades faces Cyprus bailout 
quagmire, REUTERS (Feb. 24, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyprus/after-election-win-
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Consolidation of the Banks.  These provisions awarded the Central BOC 
extensive powers to enact a series of measures to assist in the consolidation 
or liquidation of financial institutions in Cyprus.  The law further provided 
for the creation of a Consolidation Authority that would act as a “receiver 
manager” with extensive authority for the consolidation of the banks. 
 
Finally, on March 25, 2013, a deal was reached.  In fact, on the same 
day the Eurogroup had made a statement that an agreement had been 
reached with the Cypriot authorities on the key elements necessary for a 
future macroeconomic adjustment program.  The Eurogroup said this 
agreement was supported by all euro area member states and by the 
Commission, the ECB, and the IMF.  The statement contained an annex with 
the terms of the Agreement; including the following provisions97: 
 
x It was agreed that Cyprus would receive 10 billion euro as 
financial assistance; such assistance would not be used to 
recapitalize either CPB or BOC.  All other banks in Cyprus 
would be provided with unlimited funds as needed. 
x Additionally, the Annex provided for certain measures to be 
taken immediately in relation to the two problematic banks: 
o CPB would be resolved immediately—with full 
contribution of equity shareholders, bond holders and 
uninsured depositors—based on the Bank Resolution 
Framework.  CPB would be separated into a good bank 
and a bad bank; the good bank will be folded into BOC 
along with 9 billion of ELA, while the bad bank will be 
run down over time. 
o BOC would be recapitalized through a deposit/equity 
conversion of uninsured deposits with full contribution of 
equity shareholders and bond holders, so that a capital 
ratio of 9% would be secured by the end of the program. 
 
On March 25, 2013, the Governor of the Central BOC placed both 
banks into resolution.  On March 26, 2013 the Memorandum of 
Understanding was adopted by the ESM and the Republic of Cyprus, 
reiterating the terms of the Eurogroup’s announcement.  Shortly after, on 
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March 29, 2013, the Cyprus Central Bank published two decrees, Decrees 
No. 103 and 104, finalizing the agreement reached with the ESM. 
 
V. THE CYPRUS HAIRCUT: COERCION OR JUST HARD POLITICS? 
 
The Cyprus banking haircut was unprecedented.  It is unclear, 
however, whether the bail-out terms were wilfully accepted by the Cypriot 
government or whether it was coerced and forced to accept same as a “take 





Undoubtedly, Cyprus was “forced” to accept some difficult terms.  
However, does this mean that the banking haircut of the two major banks in 
Cyprus was a product of economic coercion?  To analyze whether the facts 
of the Cyprus banking haircut satisfy the aforementioned criteria for 
economic coercion, this Article will focus on the decision of the Governing 
Council of the ECB of March 21, 2013.  As a result of this decision, the 
provision of ELA to BOC and CPB was to be stopped on March 25, 2013 
unless and until Cyprus agreed to a bailout program.  To respond to this 
question, we must first examine the legal framework surrounding ECB’s 
decision.  This is the topic to which we now turn.  
 
Primarily, the legal nature of ELA must be identified.  ELA is a 
temporary measure to support solvent credit institutions that are facing 
temporary liquidity problems.98  The provision of ELA is a competence 
enjoyed by each member state through their NCBs.99  This discretion falls 
outside of the functions that generally arise from their membership in the 
European System of Central Banks (“ESCB”) or Eurosystem.100  ELA is 
therefore not a monetary policy instrument, nor is it an ESCB or Eurosystem 
function; it is awarded by the NCBs.  Hence, to a large extent, the provision 
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of ELA facilities is a national matter governed by the national laws of the 
NCB’s state of incorporation under the national NCB legal framework.101 
 
As the NCBs are responsible for granting ELA, they enjoy wide 
discretion to decide the terms and conditions on which ELA is offered.  In 
particular, Article 14.4 of the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB explicitly 
stipulates that NCBs may perform functions other than those specified in the 
Statute: “Such functions shall be performed on the responsibility and 
liability of national central banks and shall not be regarded as being part of 
the functions of the ESCB.”102 
 
That said, such discretion should not be exercised in contravention of 
other legal obligations of the states or the NCBs.  In particular, the granting 
of ELA facility to a specific banking institution should not be contrary to 
rules on state aid.  To this end, the European Commission has issued 
guidelines on how state aid rules apply in the case of ELA, recognizing four 
conditions which, if met, indicate there is no violation of the state aid rules.  
Those conditions are: a) an ELA should be awarded only to solvent, but 
illiquid, banking institutions,103 and should be part of a larger “rescue 
package” but a limited and exceptional temporary case; b) the facility should 
be secured by adequate collateral; c) the Central Bank should impose a 
punitive interest rate to the beneficiary institution; and d) ELA should be 
provided at NCB’s discretion and should not be supported on or by state’s 
guarantees.104 
 
Furthermore, although ELA is not provided within the ESCB 
framework, it should not interfere with the objectives and tasks of the ESCB.  
The provision of ELA should therefore be consistent with the “monetary 
financing prohibition” as defined under Article 123 of the Treaty of the 
Functioning of the European Union, which prohibits overdraft facilities or 
any other type of credit facility with an NCB in favor of the public sector.  
This prohibition includes any financing of the public sector’s obligations 
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vis-à-vis third parties.105  The ECB has issued several opinions stressing the 
criteria that should be followed by NCB when providing ELA under Article 
123.  The criteria are: a) the credit provided by the NCB should be provided 
for as short a term as possible; b) there must be systemic stability aspects at 
stake; c) there must be no doubts as to the legal validity and enforceability of 
the state guarantee under applicable national law; and d) there must be no 
doubts as to the economic adequacy of the state guarantee, which should 
cover both principal and interest on the loans, fully preserving the NCB’s 
financial independence.106 
 
Lastly, Article 14.4 of the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB grants the 
Governing Council of the ECB the right to stop or restrict an ELA facility 
from operating.  This can occur if the ECB considers that ELA is interfering 
with the objectives and tasks of the Eurosystem and at least two thirds of the 
votes cast oppose to further ELA.  It is for these reasons that a NCB granting 
ELA must inform the ECB of all relevant details within two days.107 
 
The Governing Council of ECB’s March 21, 2013 decision to 
maintain the ELA level granted until March 25, 2013 was founded exactly 
on Article 14.4.  As can be determined from the wording of Article 14.4, 
there are two conditions that should be met for the Governing Council to 
decide to terminate or otherwise restrict ELA.  The first one is procedural 
and dictates that such a decision should be taken and ratified by at least two 
thirds of the votes.  The second one is substantive and provides that the 
decision should be based on the premise that the continuation of ELA would 
impair some specific object and task of the Eurosystem.  The second 
condition cannot be subject to review by any state (or other European 
institutions, for that matter) and is decided solely on the Governing 
Council’s discretion.  To the extent that the procedural condition of 
receiving at least two thirds of the votes was met, the decision of the 
Governing Council of March 21, 2013 can be considered justified.  
However, it is necessary to examine whether the exercise of such discretion 
constitutes coercion.  This is the topic to which we now turn. 
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B. Theories of Coercion 
 
As discussed above, the definition of economic coercion is not settled 
in international scholarship, is complicated, and requires examination of 
several factors.  Nonetheless, this Article will examine whether the facts of 
the Cyprus banking haircut can satisfy the aforementioned criteria, which 
have been recognized by different scholars as ingredients of economic 
coercion. 
 
The first criterion proposed by Professor Bowett requires an improper 
motive or intent on the part of the state performing the coercive act.108  Such 
intent should be primarily for the purpose of damaging the economy of 
another state or as a means of coercing another state.109  The question here, 
therefore, is whether the ECB acted with an improper motive for the purpose 
of damaging the Cypriot economy when it suddenly decided to stop the 
provision of ELA to Cyprus’ second largest bank.  As discussed above, the 
intent of a state or an EU institution is not easy to detect, let alone prove.  It 
would require a thorough examination of the surrounding situations.  In the 
case of the Cyprus banking haircut, the decision of the Governing Council of 
the ECB was made at a time when CPB had already been insolvent for 
several months, raising suspicions that the ECB decision might have been 
coercive.  That said, at that period, the Cyprus government’s six-month 
deadline to present a viability plan for CPB to the EU Commission had just 
expired.  Furthermore, the ECB, as will be discussed below in detail, acted 
legally and in accordance with its policy when it decided to stop funding the 
insolvent CPB.  Thus, although the timing of the decision, the very short 
notice given by ECB prior to the implementation of the decision, and the 
unprecedented terms of the bailout program certainly raise some questions 
regarding ECB’s motives, these motives do not clearly indicate coercive 
intent.  It is therefore very difficult to demonstrate persuasively that the ECB 
intended to damage the Cyprus economy.  Furthermore, it is not 
demonstrably within ECB’s interest to inflict this damage since it would 
ultimately hurt ECB’s goals of price stability. 
 
For ECB’s decision to constitute coercion under the second criterion, 
ECB must have acted to obtain some benefit of any kind by subordinating 
Cypriot sovereignty.  Any claim that ECB aimed to obtain specific benefits 
                                                          
108  Bowett, supra note 60, at 1–12. 
109  Id.  
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by exercising pressure on the Cypriot government is not supported by any 
official documentation.  The decision was made in accordance with Article 
14 of the ECBS Statute to safeguard Eurosystem’s tasks and goals and to 
restore legality under ECB’s statute.  Furthermore, it cannot be claimed 
effectively that the ECB subordinated the sovereignty of the Cypriot state, as 
Cyprus has itself awarded such powers to the ECB. 
 
The last criterion requires that the coercion be tantamount to force in 
the sense that it can endanger the coerced state’s security, economy, and 
other structures.  Certainly, the imminent collapse of the Cypriot Banking 
System was a credible threat to Cyprus’ social security, safety, and 
economy, and could be directly linked with the ECB’s decision.  Even so, 
ECB was not responsible for the financial position of CPB and the latter’s 
insolvency, nor for the dire state of the Cyprus economy, which was clearly 
attributed to the inadequate management of the Bank and to the Cypriot 
government.110  Professor Tom Farer argues that non-concession of 
assistance or aid to another state falls short of coercion in every case, as a 
state is always free to decide whether to continue providing assistance on the 
basis of each state’s own interests.111  In this case, therefore, the ECB’s 
decision to cease providing ELA to the Cypriot banks cannot be classified as 
coercive. 
 
As such, it does not appear clear that the Cypriot government was 
coerced into agreeing to the bailout program.  Even if that was the case, 
however, not all forms of coercion are illegal under international law, as 
indicated below. 
 
1. Retorsion and Reprisals 
 
Not all hostile and unfriendly competitive acts can be considered 
illegal coercion.  Indeed, international law recognizes that a state is free to 
respond to an injurious act done by another state through a hostile, yet legal, 
act.112  Such acts of retorsion are considered a state’s means of self-help 
when it is subjected to an illegal act.  Retorsions aim to compel the party 
acting illegally to rescind such an act. 
                                                          
110  See Gikas A. Hardouvelisa & Ioannis Gkionis, Decade Long Economic Crisis: Cyprus versus 
Greece, 10 CYPRUS ECON. POL’Y REV. 3, 13 (2016).  
111  Tom J. Farer, Political and Economic Coercion in Contemporary International Law, 79 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 405 (1985). 
112  JAN KLABBERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 168 (2nd ed. 2013). 
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Overall, acts of retorsion are deemed legal, even in the absence of a 
previous injurious act, since states retain the right to be unfriendly to one 
another in pursuit of their interests.113  However, some commentators have 
argued that if retorsion is in pursuit of a wrongful end, such as an act for the 
sole aim of causing harm to another state, it becomes illegal.114  Once the act 
ceases to be legal, it no longer constitutes retorsion.  Hence, retorsion falls 
short of coercion in the legal sense of the term.  If a hostile act is of such 
degree so as to constitute coercion, it is considered a prohibited intervention 
under international law and no longer qualifies as retorsion.115  Retorsion is 
distinguished from reprisals in that reprisals are in themselves illegal acts, 
which are justified under international law as a response to a previous 
violation of the law by the state at which the reprisal is directed.116  Reprisals 
are allowed under international law, allowing states to respond to a prior 
illegal act as means of “self-help.”  
 
Self-help is a necessary remedy since international law does not 
provide an effective enforcement mechanism.117  There is no “Court [or] 
central authority above the Sovereign States which could compel a 
delinquent State to give reparation.”118  The Naulilaa arbitration case 
provided the classic definition of the term reprisal and its elements, 
providing that:  
 
Reprisals are an act of self-help on the part of the injured states, 
responding after an unsatisfied demand to an act contrary to 
international law on the part of the offending State . . . .  They 
would be illegal if a previous act contrary to international law 
had not furnished the reason for them.  They aim to impose on 
the offending State reparation for the offense or the return to 
legality in avoidance of new offenses.119 
 
                                                          
113  ROBERT PIEDELIEVRE, PRECIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC, OU, DROIT DE GENS (1894). 
114  ANGELO LABELLA & BENEDETTO CONFORTI, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 
(2012). 
115  Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Legal Mechanisms to Assess and Mitigate Adverse Human Rights 
Impact of Unilateral Sanctions Through Accountability (2015) 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Events/Seminars/CoercitiveMeasures/AntoniosTzanakopoulos.doc. 
116  KLABBERS, supra note 112, at 168. 
117  Andrew D. Mitchell, Does One Illegality Merit Another? The Law of Belligerent Reprisals in 
International Law, 170 MIL. L. REV. 155 (2001). 
118  FRANCIS & OPPENHEIM, supra note 68.  
119  Julia Pfeil, Naulilaa Arbitration (Portugal v Germany), MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (March 2007) http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e178?rskey=HJjp7b&result=1&prd=EPIL.    
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Reprisals can constitute a form of coercion.  The Institut de Droit 
International defines reprisals as: 
 
[M]easures of coercion, derogating from the ordinary rules of 
the law of the people, determined and taken by a State, 
following the commission of illicit acts against it by another 
State, and having as their aim to impose on the second State, 
through pressure exerted by means of harm, a return to 
legality.120 
 
Traditionally, reprisals included any illegal act, including measures of 
economic coercion as well as armed attacks.121  The term, however, has been 
replaced by two concepts: belliquent, or self-defense, reprisals used in armed 
conflict, and countermeasures, or those reprisals of a non-forcible nature.122  
Economic coercion can be considered a type of countermeasure. 
 
Countermeasures are an exception to the rule that coercion constitutes 
an illegal intervention in that they are not illegal per se, but can be justified, 
provided certain conditions are met.123  This is recognized by the Draft 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
(“DASR”).  Although DASR is not a multinational convention, it codifies 
customary law.124  Indeed, Article 22 of the DASR provides that “[t]he 
wrongfulness of an act of a state not in conformity with an international 
obligation towards another state is precluded if and to the extent that the act 
constitutes a countermeasure,” provided certain substantive and procedural 
conditions are met.125  Such substantive and procedural conditions constitute 
the limits of countermeasures.  If these conditions are not met, 
countermeasures are illegal as coercive acts.  The same principle is reiterated 
on Article 22 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of International 
Organisations (“DARIO”), which aim to clarify the circumstances under 
which an international organization is liable for breach of an international 
                                                          
120  M. Nicolas Politis, Régime de répresaillies en temps de paix, INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 
(1934), http://www.idi-iil.org/app/uploads/2017/06/1934_paris_03_fr.pdf. 
121  Colin Warbrick, Book Review, 35 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 202, 202–03 (1986) (reviewing 
ELIZABETH ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES: AN ANALYSIS OF COUNTER-MEASURES (1984)). 
122  ARNOLD PRONTO & MICHAEL WOOD, 4 THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 1999-2009: 
TREATIES, FINAL DRAFT ARTICLES AND OTHER MATERIALS 329 (2011). 
123  See generally MAKIO MIYAGAWA, DO ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WORK? (2016). 
124  SUSAN BREAU, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN EMERGING 
PARADIGM SHIFT 68–69 (2016). 
125  Int’l L. Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts on 
its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 75 (2001). 
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obligation and the consequences of such breach.  It must be stipulated that 
DARIO does not enjoy the status of customary law, as is the case with 
DASR.  In fact, DARIO has been met with skepticism by states, 
international organizations, and academics.  Nonetheless, as argued by 
Professor Kristina Daugirdas, DARIO may become customary law.126  Thus, 
these conditions provide a means for testing whether the Cyprus bank 
haircut was the result of coercive actions.  We shall now examine the 
substantive and procedural conditions that constitute the limits of 
countermeasures. 
 
2.  Limits of Countermeasures 
 
Initially, arbitral tribunals, such as in the Naulilaa arbitration, set out 
certain conditions that must be met for countermeasures to be legal.127  The 
Naulilaa decision indicates that for countermeasures to be legal, (1) they 
must be executed only by a state through its institutions; (2) they must be 
proportionate; and (3) they must follow an illicit act where negotiations to 
restore legality have failed.128 
 
These criteria were re-affirmed in the arbitration case Air Service 
Agreement, which referred exclusively to countermeasures.129  This case 
examined the decision of the United States to ban certain French flights from 
landing in the United States following France’s decision to prohibit Pan 
American passengers from disembarking in Paris.  France’s decision was 
due to an alleged breach of the 1946 bilateral agreement between France and 
the U.S., which provided for civil air flights between the two countries.  The 
tribunal reaffirmed states’ rights to resort to countermeasures but noted that 
such measures should 1) be relevant to a previous violation by the state 
receiving the countermeasures and 2) be proportionate in light of the 
previous violation.  In relation to the third requirement, which was upheld in 
the Naulilaa case—namely that a countermeasure should constitute the last 
resort following failed negotiations—the Tribunal in the Service Agreement 
case reasoned that starting countermeasures during negotiations was not 
                                                          
126  Kristina Daugirdas, Reputation and the Responsibility of International Organizations, 25 EUR.J. 
INT’L L. 991–1018 (2014). 
127  See Pfeil, supra note 119.  
128  See id.; see also EDWARD K. KWAKWA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: 
PERSONAL AND MATERIAL FIELDS OF APPLICATION (1992). 
129  Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946 (U.S. v. France), 18 R.I.A.A. 417–93 (1979). 
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prohibited.  Similar recognition of the legitimacy of countermeasures was 
indicated in the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project130 and the Cysne131 cases. 
 
These conditions were codified in Article 22 of the DASR, which 
echoes customary law.  Furthermore, Articles 49–51 of the DASR outline 
the limits of economic countermeasures.  Such limits are separated in 
substantive and procedural limits; the procedural limits are set in Article 49, 
while Articles 50 and 51 set out the substantive limits.  According to Article 
49, countermeasures are permissible if taken by an injured state to induce the 
responsible state to cease its internationally wrongful conduct.  This upholds 
the principle initially set out in the GabčÌkovo-Nagymaros Project case,132 
by virtue of which the existence of an internationally wrongful act is a 
prerequisite for the justification of a countermeasure.133  This leads to the 
following conclusions: 
 
x Primarily, countermeasures may only be taken against the 
violating state, and acts directed against third states would not 
be justified as countermeasures.  That said, if countermeasures 
taken against the violating state also indirectly affect third 
states, this alone does not necessarily render a countermeasure 
illegal under Article 22 of the DASR.134 
x Secondly, countermeasures can only be taken by an injured 
state, meaning that non-injured states may not affect 
countermeasures.  That said, in case there is a serious violation 
of an obligation owed to the international community as a 
whole, any state may take countermeasures.135 
x Lastly, countermeasures may be taken to induce a state to cease 
its internationally wrongful conduct.  A countermeasure cannot 
be justified if it goes beyond the goal of economic inducement 
to economic coercion, forcing the other state to do something it 
is not obligated to do under international law.136  This also 
means that countermeasures should cease as soon as their aim 
                                                          
130  Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 92 (Sept. 25, 1997).  
131  The Cysne (Port. v. Ger.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1371, 1371–86 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1933). 
132  Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project supra note 130 at ¶ 83.  
133  International Law Commission, Comments on the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts [hereinafter Draft Articles], on its Fifty-Sixth Session, U.N. GAOR, Supp. 
No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10  (2001). 
134  Id. 
135  GIORGIO GAJA, THE PROTECTION OF THE GENERAL INTERESTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY, in 364 RECUEIL DES COURS 131 (2014).  
136  Tzanakopoulos, supra note 47, at 10.  
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of inducement is met, and shouldn’t continue thereafter as they 
would no longer constitute a response to an illegal act. 
 
The wrongfulness of an international act can only be judged retrospectively, 
so a state resorting to countermeasures due to alleged wrongful violations 
does so at its own peril.137 
 
Apart from the procedural limits described above, Articles 50 and 51 
of the DASR set various substantive conditions for counter measures to be 
justified.  Article 50 provides that countermeasures should refrain from 
violating international obligations regarding the use of force, fundamental 
human rights, obligations of a humanitarian character prohibiting reprisals, 
and obligations under peremptory norms of general international law. 
 
Lastly, Article 51 sets a substantive limit on the nature and extent of 
countermeasures, providing that countermeasures should respect the 
principle of proportionality.  Proportionality requires that adoption of 
countermeasures does not lead to inequitable results.  Hence, for 
countermeasures to be proportionate, they should assess both the amount of 
injury suffered and the nature of the rights in question and the seriousness of 
the breach.138  The reference to “the rights in question” should be broadly 
interpreted so as to refer not only to the rights infringed but also to the rights 
of the violating state.139  Considering this, punitive countermeasures will 
likely never be permitted under international law.140 
 
In relation to the limits set to countermeasures taken by an 
international organization against a state, DARIO does not specifically 
regulate this issue, but Article 22 of DARIO refers to the “substantive and 
procedural conditions required by international law.”  As per the 
commentary of DARIO, Articles 49 to 54 of DASR should be applied 
respectively.141 
 
                                                          
137  See, Air Service Agreement (U.S. v. Fr.), 18 R.I.A.A. 417, 433 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1978). 
138  Draft Articles, supra note 133, at 135.  
139  See U.S. v. Fr., 1978 R. I. A. A. at 433.  
140  Draft Articles, supra note 133, at 326.  
141  International Law Commission, Comments on the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of 
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The Article will now examine whether the Governing Council of 
ECB’s March 21, 2013 decision, if deemed coercive, can be justified as a 
countermeasure or an act of retorsion.  As we have already established the 
decision of March 21, 2013 was legal, it is an act of retorsion, which is 
permitted under international law even if it is punitive or hostile so long as it 
is proportionate. 
 
In this analysis, coercion would only need to be examined if ECB’s 
decision was illegal; however, as analyzed above, we cannot classify ECB’s 
decision as illegal under any of the coercion criteria, given that ECB acted 
within its scope of powers and rightfully exercised its discretion.  Even if 
ECB’s decision was deemed illegal, ECB could raise the defense of 
countermeasures given that all the respective conditions are met; namely, 
Cyprus may have been in breach of an obligation due to the EU under the 
Stability and Growth Pact, which is a pre-condition for EU Membership.  
The Stability and Growth Pact requires that all member states’ government 
debt/GDP ratio is not over the 60%. Cyprus’ government debt to GDP ratio 
was well above the relevant threshold in 2010, 2011, and 2012, and reached 
102% in 2013.  It can be argued further that ECB’s decision of March 21, 
2013 that “ELA would be continued if and only if a programme was in place 
that would ensure the solvency of the banks concerned,”142 was made as a 
direct consequence of that breach. Indeed, ELA could not continue to be 
given to an insolvent bank.  This would be a credit facility aimed to defer 
government-funded recapitalization, in breach of Article 123 of the Treaty of 
the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”), which prohibits the 
financing of public budgets in member states through the ECB and the 
NCB.143  
 
To conclude, establishing liability for European institutions on the 
grounds of economic coercion, illegal retorsion or non-proportional 
countermeasure appears to be a very difficult task for Cyprus. Investors 
would be barred from even bringing such claims, as DARIO is not binding 
at its present state, but also can only be invoked by states and international 
organizations and not by individuals.  This analysis indicates that it is a 
                                                          
142  Jörg Asmussen, Exchange of Views with the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the 
European Parliament on Financial Assistance to Cyprus, European Central Bank (May 8, 2013), 
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difficult task for investors to render European institutions liable or co-liable 
for such losses. 
 
C. Basing Liability on Other Grounds 
 
Due to these difficulties, it is worth exploring whether investors can 
base their claim against European institutions for losses associated with 
financial distress measures on other grounds, especially on the TFEU.  To 
this end, this Article will examine available remedies under the TFEU. 
 
1. Article 263 of the TFEU: Annulment of Illegal Actions 
 
Article 263 of the TFEU contains a provision allowing judicial review 
of the acts of EU institutions.  In particular, it allows, inter alia, individuals 
to bring actions in the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) 
against EU institutions that have acted illegally.144  However, before 
individuals can demonstrate that the EU institution’s act is illegal, they must 
first demonstrate they have fulfilled the locus standi preconditions set out in 
the relevant article.  It is worth mentioning that before the Treaty of Lisbon, 
Article 263 had been scarcely used as a means of enforcing individual rights 
due to the onerous requirements that individual applicants must meet, 
namely that the act was a matter of “direct and individual concern” to 
them.145  Indeed, in the leading Plaumann case, the Court held that an 
applicant would be successful in showing that he had direct and individual 
concern by a decision, only “if that decision affects them by reason of 
certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in 
which they are differentiated from all other persons and by virtue of these 
factors distinguishes them individually just as in the case of the person 
addressed.”146 
 
                                                          
144  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 263, Oct. 26, 
2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47 (hereinafter TFEU) (distinguishing between the so called privileged applicants, 
which consists of states and EU institututions, which are granted unlimited locus standi, and non-privileged 
applicants, including individual applicants, who are a given restricted locus standi).  
145  Vaughne Miller, Taking a complaint to the Court of Justice of the European Union, Standard Note 
SN05397, 6 (2010). 
146  Case 25/62, Plaumann & Co. v. Comm’n, 1963 E.C.R. 95.  For an extensive presentation and 
analysis of former caselaw, see Anthony Arnull, Private Applicants and the Action for Annulment Under 
Article 173 Of the EC Treaty,  32 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 7 (1995). 
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Following the Treaty of Lisbon, the conditions for the admissibility of 
actions brought by individuals have been eased, depending on the act 
challenged, so that individual applicants can now challenge: 
 
x An act addressed to them; 
x An act addressed to another person, which was of direct and 
individual concern to them; or 
x A regulatory act which was of direct concern to him and did not 
entail implementing measures.147 
 
In relation to what constitutes a regulatory act, Professor De Witte 
argues that it is tantamount to non-legislative acts, that is, “acts not adopted 
in accordance with the ordinary or special legislative procedure.”148  Such 
acts, according to Girón Larrucea, need not directly affect an addressee, 
“except for the sole reason that they are one of the participants in a certain 
area of activity for the general regulation of which the act was adopted.”149 
 
Decisions of EU Institutions made in the framework of sovereign 
default, which constitutes exceptional circumstances, are likely to be 
regulatory acts, although this is not always the case.  This issue was 
examined by the General Court when distressed depositors from the Cyprus 
Bank that had sustained haircuts in their bank deposits resorted to the court 
requesting the cancellation of the sale of operation in CPB in cases T-327/13 
through Τ-331/13.150  The applicants in all five cases turned against the 
European Commission and the ECB, as, according to the applicants, the 
decision of the Eurogroup of March 25, 2013 should be attributed to them.  
In their view, the decrees issued by the Cyprus Central Bank were simply 
putting Eurogroup’s statement into effect.  Their main argument was that the 
Eurogroup’s decision of the 25th of March, which was materialized through 
the Banking Resolution Framework (Decree No. 103 and 104 of the 
Governor of Cyprus Central Bank as the representative and/or agent of the 
European System of Central Banks), was in excess of Eurogroup’s power 
                                                          
147  Richard Lang, Quite a Challenge: Article 263(4) TFEU and the Case of the Mystery Measures, 
SSRN ELECTRONIC J. 2 (2011). 
148  Floris De Witte, The European Judiciary After Lisbon, 15 J. EUR. & COMP. L. 43, 47 (2008). 
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EL TRATADO DE LISBOA 267, (Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia 2008); but see De Witte, supra note 148, at 47.  
150  Case T-327/13 Mallis and Mallis v Commission and ECB, Case T-328/13 Tameio Pronoias 
Prosopikou Trapezis Kyprou v Commission and ECB, Case T-329/13 Chatzithoma v Commission and 
ECB, Case T-330/13 Chatziioannou v Commission and ECB, and Case T-331/13 Nikolaou v Commission 
and ECB. 
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and authorities and thus intervening on Cyprus’ sovereignty.  The General 
Court initially examined whether the Eurogroup statement could, in fact, be 
attributed to the ECB or the European Commission, as otherwise the 
application would be inadmissible.151  The General Court concluded that the 
Eurogroup is an informal discussion forum at ministerial level between 
representatives of the member states whose currency is the euro, without any 
legislative decision-making competences.152  The General Court noted that, 
despite ECB’s participation in its meetings, its actions could not be 
attributed to the ECB or the European Commission.153  The General Court 
further considered if the statement could be attributed to the ESM, rather 
than to the Eurogroup.  The applicants claimed that, in such case, the act 
would be attributable to the ECB.  The General Court ruled, however, that, 
even in such case, this fact would still not allow the inference that the 
Commission or the ECB instigated the adoption of that statement.154  As 
such, it ruled that an annulment was not possible under Article 263 of the 
TFEU and that the application was inadmissible.  The case would be 
different if the statement was issued by the Council under its ECOFIN 
configuration, as in such a case, the Decrees 103 and 104 would in fact be 
implementing EU law.155  
 
The decision of the General Court was appealed (Joined Cases C-
105/15 P to C-109/15 P), but the CJEU upheld the dismissal.  The CJEU 
reiterated that the Eurogroup’s statement could not be regarded as a joint 
decision of the Commission and the ECB.  Under the ESM framework, these 
bodies did not have the power to make decisions of their own under the 
ESM Treaty and the mere participation of the EU Commission and the ECB 
in the meetings of the Eurogroup was not sufficient to alter the nature of 
Eurogroup’s statements and render such statements the expression of a 
decision-making power of the ECB and the EU Commission.  Finally, the 
CJEU noted that, as Cyprus adopted the legal framework for the banks’ 
restructuring, this cannot be regarded as having been imposed by an alleged 
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decision jointly taken by the EU Commission and the ECB expressed in the 
Eurogroup statement. 
  
Therefore, only in cases where investors can prove an act was 
addressed to them, was a direct and individual concern to them, or was a 
regulatory act can investors challenge the legality of an act taken by an EU 
Institution within the framework of sovereign default to the extent, of 
course, that such an act directly affects the interests of such investors.  
However, for investors to succeed, they must further demonstrate that such 
act actually contradicts EU Law, something that seems difficult to do given 
the wide discretion that is enjoyed by EU institutions in this field. 
 
2. Article 265 of the TFEU: Complaint for Failure to Act 
 
Article 265 of the TFEU provides that, in cases where a European 
Institution has an affirmative duty—and not just discretionary power—to act 
but failed to do so, such inaction can be deemed an infringement of the 
TFEU and, as such, an illegal omission.156  This article applies specifically 
in cases of inaction by European institutions when there was a legal 
obligation to act, and thus, “inaction” means non-adoption of a legal act.157  
To this end, Article 265 does not apply to negative acts. 
 
If the European Court rules that there was in fact an infringement of 
EU law due to inaction, it will order the respective institutions to take all 
necessary actions to remedy the omission.158  Article 265 differentiates 
between privileged and non-privileged investors, with the former comprised 
of member states and institutions of the EU and the latter private parties who 
have a limited right of locus standi159 in that they must have a personal 
interest in taking action in order to bring proceedings before the Court of 
Justice.160  In particular, the Court has stressed on several occasions that 
applications by individuals should be limited to decisions addressed to 
individuals.161 
 
                                                          
156  NIGEL FOSTER, FOSTER ON EU LAW 220 (5th ed. 2015). 
157  See Case 125/78, GEMA v. Eur. Comm., 1979, E.C.R. 3178–79. 
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An action based on Article 265 can be brought only against an EU 
institution (the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the 
Commission, or the ECB).162  This course of action might be used by 
investors where an EU institution failed to take action it was legally required 
to take to avert or minimize investors’ losses due to sovereign default.  The 
crucial element for investors is to demonstrate that the EU institution has 
unlawfully failed to act when such action was required by EU law.  In such a 
case, investors could resort to the CJEU, provided they had followed the 
procedural conditions provided for in Article 265, including the preliminary 
procedure.163 
 
To explore whether investors can resort to this alternative, this Article 
will once again explore the case of CPB.  In the case of CPB, it is striking 
that, although CPB was insolvent and this was known to ECB, the Cyprus 
Central Bank continued to provide ELA to it nonetheless.  This continued 
funding was contrary to Article 123 of the TFEU and ECB’s policy.  Even 
so, however, it must be remembered that ECB did not have a duty to 
intervene and stop ELA before the situation devolved so dramatically.  
Indeed, the provision of ELA is a national matter, while NCBs and 
respective national authorities maintain ultimate responsibly for prudential 
supervision of eurozone banks.164  Indeed, in accordance with TFEU, ECB 
had no duty to maintain financial stability;165 rather, ECB’s authority is 
limited to “contribut[ing] to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the 
competent authorities.”166  To this end, ECB had no duty to stop the Cyprus 
NBC from granting ELA to CPB and in fact the Governing Council’s March 
21, 2013 decision was a negative action that does not justify the use of 
TFEU Article 265. 
 
It is therefore difficult to imagine that in matters of extreme financial 
distress, where national states still enjoy exclusive sovereignty to decide, 
there will be situations where EU institutions have a duty to act to prevent a 
decision or situation personally affecting investors. 
                                                          
162  TFEU art. 265. 
163  See generally Inga Daukšienė & Arvydas Budnikas, Has the Action for Failure to Act in the 
European Union Lost its Purpose? 7 BALTIC J. OF L. & POL. 209 (2014). 
164  Daniel Wilsher, Ready to Do Whatever it Takes? The Legal Mandate of the European Central 
Bank and the Economic Crisis, 15 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. OF EUR. LEGAL STUD. 503, 503–36 (2013). 
165  Soko Tankaa, Comment Paper to Chapters “The European Central Bank and Implications of the 
Sovereign Debt Crisis,” in EUROPE'S FINANCIAL MATURITY AND ASIA'S FINANCIAL MIGHT 62 (Sahoko Kaji 
& Eiji Ogawa eds., 2013). 
166  TFEU art. 127(5). 
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3. Non-Contractual Liability of EU Institutions 
 
Finally, it is worth examining the non-contractual liability of EU 
institutions, which can be found in Article 340 of the TFEU.  The article 
provides that the EU shall make good on damage caused by its institutions. 
The definition of attributable acts includes wrongful omissions.167  In the 
case C-352/98 Bergaderm, the CJEU set out a set of conditions that must be 
met for establishing the existence of liability under Article 340 of the 
TFEU.168  These are: 
 
x The rule of law which has been breached must be one which 
is intended to confer rights on individuals.  Here, later case 
law has adopted a more liberal approach.169  In particular, 
the Kampffmeyer case170 established that it suffices to show 
that the rule infringed was intended generally for the 
protection of individuals, and not necessary that the 
applicant was “directly and individually concerned” as 
required in Article 263 of the TFEU.  Indicatively, in the 
more recent case, Camos Grau v. Commission, the 
requirement of impartiality into the conduct of Commission 
employees was found to aim not only to the respect of the 
public interest, but also to confer a right to individuals to see 
that the corresponding guarantees are complied with; 171 
x The breach must be sufficiently serious to merit an award of 
damages;172 and,  
x There must be a direct causal link between the infringement 
of the rule and the damage suffered by the claimant.173 
 
All three conditions governing the EU’s liability must jointly be 
satisfied.  If one of them is not fulfilled, the application is dismissed in its 
entirety without the necessity for the Union courts to examine the remaining 
conditions for such liability.  The Case T-79/13 Accorinti v. ECB is 
                                                          
167  See Case C-40/71 Richez-Parise v. Comm’n of Eur. Communities, 1972 E.C.R. 73. 
168 See Case C-352/98 Bergaderm and Groupil v. Comm’n of Eur. Communities, 2000 E.C.R. 1–5291.  
169  See Case C-13-24/66 Kampffmeyer and others v. Comm’n of Eur. Communities, 1967 E.C.R. 
245.  
170  Id. 
171  See generally Case T-309/03 Manel Camos Grau v. Comm’n of the European Community.  
172  See generally Case T-241/09 Court of Auditors of the European Union. 
173  Id. 
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indicative of this matter.174  The case revolved around the Greek Sovereign 
Bonds Haircut through Private Sector Involvement (PSI).  It was filed by 
Allessandro Accortini along with over 200 plaintiffs from Italy, all holders of 
Greek Sovereign bonds.  
 
Plaintiffs claimed that, by virtue of the Exchange Agreement of 
February 15, 2012 and the ECB’s Decision 2012/153/EU, which provided 
that Greek bonds had to be guaranteed by the Greek government in favor of 
the ECB and the NBCs in order to be eligible for Eurosystem operations, 
ECB and the NBCs received preferential treatment over all other holders of 
Greek Sovereign bonds.175  Plaintiffs claimed the above constituted a breach 
of the principle of equal treatment amongst private creditors, while the fact 
that the ECB was buying Greek sovereign bonds while issuing calming 
statements for private investors was infringing their legitimate expectations 
and the principle of legal certainty.  For these they claimed damages of more 
than 12.5 million euros in accordance with Article 268 and 340 of the TFEU.  
 
As noted above, Article 340 of the TFEU provides the cumulative 
conditions that must be satisfied for the European Union to be liable under 
non-contractual liability.  In particular, these are: a) that the institution must 
act unlawfully, b) actual damage must have been suffered and c) lastly, there 
must be a causal link between the unlawful and the damage pleaded.176  The 
General Court in the Accorinti case concluded that the first condition of 
Article 340, namely the existence of an unlawful conduct, was not fulfilled, 
as the ECB acted within the discretion awarded to it by Articles 127 and 282 
of the TFEU and therefore acted in compliance with EU law.  The General 
Court concluded that bond holders’ losses could not be attributed to the 
ECB, as economic risks are inherent in the commercial activities carried out 
in the financial sector.  To this end, private investors could not rely on the 
principle of the protection of legitimate expectations or on the principle of 
legal certainty.  
 
Furthermore, the General Court found that ECB’s statements were 
generic and bondholders, as diligent and well-informed investors, should 
have had knowledge of the highly unstable economic circumstances 
surrounding the Greek sovereign bonds.  The Court further concluded that in 
all cases, the decision of the Greek sovereign debt restructuring was made by 
                                                          
174  See generally Case T-224/12 European Central Bank v. Accorinti and Others. 
175  Decision of the European Central Bank 2012/153/EU (March 5, 2012). 
176  See Case T-309/10 Christoph Klein v European Comm’n, 2014 E.C.R. ¶¶ 56–59. 
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the Greek government, which enjoyed exclusive competence on this matter 
and could not be attributed to the ECB.  Lastly, the General Court rejected 
the argument that the general principle of equal treatment could apply 
between private investors and the ECB as some were not in a comparable 
situation, given the different motives that had driven them, namely public 
interest in the case of ECB and the pursuit of private profit in the case of 
private investors.  Greece, and not the ECB, was only bound under pari 
passu clauses in the Greek sovereign bonds to ensure equal treatment of 
investors by ensuring that bonds were treated on “the same level footing 
without preference or priority among themselves . . . .”177  The General 
Court dismissed the application on the above grounds.  
 
The same result was also reached in the case Nausicaa Anadyomène 
SAS and Banque d’escompte v. ECB,178 which was based on the same set of 
facts.  The General Court found that the ECB had not infringed the 
legitimate expectations of the private holders of Greek bonds, the principle 
of legal certainty, or the principle of equal treatment of private creditors.  
The Court said that, in a field such as that of monetary policy, which is 
subject to constant changes, commercial banks may not rely upon the 
principle of the protection of legitimate expectations or upon the principle of 
legal certainty.179  Hence, as the ECB had not actively encouraged investors 
to acquire or retain Greek debt instruments through its acts or statements, the 
General Court held that the ECB is not bound to compensate the loss 
sustained by commercial banks holding Greek debt instruments by the 
restructuring of Greek debt.180 
 
The CJEU also examined the partial annulment of the Memorandum 
of Understanding of April 26, 2013 entered between Cyprus and the ESM in 
the Ledra Advertising Limited Joined Cases T 289-/13 to T-291/13.  In those 
cases, applicants were depositors that claimed specific provisions of the 
Memorandum were in breach of human rights considerations, referring to 
the European Convention of Human Rights and the EU Charter of Human 
Rights.181  Initially, the General Court did not examine the merits of the 
                                                          
177  FRANCIS BEAUFORT PALMER, COMPANY PRECEDENTS 109–110 (8th ed. 1900). 
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cases, but ruled the claims inadmissible.  Although the EU Commission 
signed the Memorandum, it had done so on behalf of the ESM and so, as 
with the activities pursued by the Commission and the ECB in the context of 
the ESM, only the ESM is committed.  As such, as “neither the ESM nor the 
Republic of Cyprus is among the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of 
the European Union, the General Court has no jurisdiction to examine the 
legality of acts which they have adopted together.”182  The cases were 
appealed in the CJEU and, on September 20, 2016, the CJEU set aside the 
previous judgement and proceeded to examine the case on its merits.183  On 
the grounds of admissibility, the CJEU held that, as the EU Commission acts 
as the guardian of the EU treaties, it must therefore refrain from signing a 
Memorandum of Understanding whose consistency with EU law is 
questionable, as would be the case in the event of breach of the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights.184  On the merits, the CJEU held that, considering 
the imminent risk of financial losses that would have been sustained by 
depositors if the banking system had collapsed, the measures did not 
constitute a disproportionate and intolerable interference with the appellants’ 
right to property and therefore there was no breach of the Charter.185  Hence, 
the CJEU found that the EU Commission was not in breach and thus the 
conditions of Article 340 were not met.186 
 
The above case demonstrates the large discretion enjoyed by EU 
institutions and the difficulties to attach liability to them for actions related 
to measures taken in case of sovereign default, especially when such 




In cases of sovereign default, investors often sustain significant losses 
and are left looking for remedies.  Recognizing the responsible actors is of 
paramount importance as it dictates the available remedies for investors.  In 
particular, when an action can be attributed to multiple actors, investors may 
have additional legal recourse.  Additionally, the party responsible may 
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522                           WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL                VOL. 27 NO. 2  
 
impact competent Courts, applicable law, and available property for 
enforcement. 
 
In the recent case of the Cyprus banking haircut, investors were told 
by the Cypriot President that the measures leading to the haircut were 
attributable to the EU and its institutions.  To this end, several investors 
brought claims against Eurogroup and the ECB. 
 
This Article examined whether, in fact, liability could be attributed to 
the EU for the acts of a member state.  As demonstrated above, there are 
several bases upon which investors can claim compensation from EU 
institutions in the framework of sovereign default within the EU.  However, 
none of these conditions are easy to identify or fulfill. 
 
Primarily, investors can examine whether sovereign actions can be 
attributed to EU institutions through coercion.  As noted above, this is 
difficult to prove, since economic coercion is not as clear as military 
coercion and its definition is vague and subject to interpretation on a case-
by-case basis.  Even if coercion is found, investors might still be unable to 
succeed if the coercion was a countermeasure that could justify an otherwise 
illegal act.  In this respect, TFEU might offer some other alternatives.  
However, case law seems too restrictive of such claims, which must be 
examined on a case-by-case basis.  Thus, investors are unlikely to succeed in 
their claims against EU institutions in the case of sovereign default, as the 
concept of sovereignty imposes several obstacles on investors seeking 
remedies against EU institutions in case of sovereign default. 
 
